Abstract-Botnet-based distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks represent an emerging and sophisticated threat for today's Internet. Attackers are now able to mimic the behavior of legitimate users to a great extent, making the issue of countering these attacks very challenging. This paper proposes a novel scheme to mitigate botnet-based DDoS attacks. The proposed scheme, called JUST-Google, utilizes Google's strategic position as an entrance for today's Internet to distinguish between legitimate traffic and attack traffic. The main idea of JUST-Google is to let ISP's edge routers allow traffic originating from sources that are approved by Google and destined to a victim within that ISP to pass while filtering all other traffic destined to the same victim. In this context, we propose that Google T M can offer a paid service to identify legitimate sources by directing users who want to access a web site under attack to a group of nodes that will perform authentication in which users are required to solve a reverse Turing test to obtain access to the web server. We evaluate the proposed scheme through a combination of theoretical analysis and experimental studies. Our studies show that JUST-Google provides a great chance for legitimate clients to access a web site that is under a botnet-based DDoS attack without imposing a significant overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnet-based DDoS attacks represent a major challenge for researchers and network administrators because attack traffic differs from legitimate traffic by intent but not in content ( [7] - [12] ). Using botnets, attackers are now able to mimic the behavior of a legitimate user to a great extent. For example, bots can be instructed to connect to web servers, download web pages and huge files from them, and finally terminate the connection. Different than earlier DDoS attacks, botnets-based DDoS attacks do not necessarily employ source address spoofing. This makes previously proposed DDoS countermeasures (e.g., [15] - [19] ) not suitable for defense against botnet-based attacks because these countermeasures inherently assume that attack packets carry spoofed source addresses.
Most of the research conducted in the area of Botnets suggest that this is a growing threat and there is no sign that the problem will be contained any time soon. More importantly, DDoS attacks originating from these botnets will continue to pose a significant threat especially for web sites that offer non-replicable services, and therefore can not adopt a massive replication service such as the one offered by Akamai [21] to cope with this threat. To protect such web sites, we envision a DDoS protection service to be provided by the popular search engine Google T M [22] .
Web search engines (and especially Google T M ) represent the entry for today's Internet. According to [23] , %80 of web site traffic is the result of search engines. Some web sites estimate that over %95 of search engine referred traffic is referred by Google T M [26] . In fact, Web site owners are very eager to increase the number of visitors to their web sites by ensuring that they have a top search engine position and they continuously try to achieve high rankings by adopting various web site optimization techniques.
Based on the above facts, this paper extends the work presented in [14] which proposes a novel scheme to defend against Botnet-based DDoS attacks. The proposed scheme, called JUST-Google, takes advantage of Google's strategic role in driving a great percentage of traffic to a given web site. The main idea in the proposed scheme is that Google T M can assist in identifying human users from bot programs by directing users who want to access a web site under attack to a group of nodes that will perform authentication in which users are required to solve a reverse Turing test to obtain access to the web server. Performance analysis shows that a legitimate user would be able to access the web server with high probability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of Botnet-based DDoS attacks and discusses the threat model and assumptions. Motivation and objectives are discussed in Section III. Related work is discussed in section IV. Section V describes the proposed scheme. Section VI discusses several aspects of the proposed scheme and addresses important issues. Section VII studies the performance of the proposed scheme. Finally, conclusion and future work are presented in section VIII.
II. BOTNET-BASED DDOS ATTACKS: THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS A. Threat Model
Botnet-based DDoS attacks usually mimic legitimate Web browsing behavior and consume higher layer server resources such as CPU, memory, database and disk bandwidth. The attack itself is preceded by forming a botnet of thousands or even millions of machines (i.e., bots). These bots are then instructed to connect to the victim web server and start downloading different objects (e.g., web pages, images, huge files, etc.) in a way similar to normal Web browsing activity. This makes the effect of these attacks more severe as compared to the well known SYN flooding attacks [27] which are based on half open connections. This is due to the fact that bots consume more resources when they establish full TCP connections with the targeted victim, and the situation becomes even worse when bots start to download content from the target.
The biggest challenge in these attack is that the victim is not able to distinguish attack traffic from legitimate traffic, which means that the attacker can easily flood some bottleneck resource with more requests than can be handled ensuring that only a small fraction of the legitimate requests are serviced. Given that the attack requests differ from legitimate request in intent, but not in content, the only option for the victim is to drop requests randomly. Since the attack traffic rate is usually much higher than the legitimate traffic rate, the attacker will succeed in occupying a disproportional amount of victim's resources for a maximum amount of time.
B. Assumptions
The following is a list of assumptions that we make in this work. It is to be noted that many of these assumptions are largely adopted from the work done in [20] .
• The attacker may have full control over an arbitrary number of machines that can be widely distributed across the Internet. The attacker may also have arbitrarily large CPU power and memory resources.
• An attacker cannot sniff packets on a major link which might carry traffic for a large number of legitimate users. Further, the attacker does not have access to the servers local network or physical access to the server itself • Zombies cannot solve the graphical test and the attacker is not able to concentrate a large number of humans to continuously solve reverse Turing tests.
• The victim site has certain DDoS detection mechanism in place. To be added ..
• Google
T M itself can withstand a powerful Botnetbased DDoS attack. This is a realistic assumption because Google T M adopts a massive replication service and it has a lot of resources that enables it to cope with a massive Botnet-based attacks.
• Web users who fail to access a web server directly are very likely to try accessing it through a search engine (such as Google Theoretically, the first three categories represent the total legitimate traffic that may reach a web site. Based on the fact that search engine referred traffic usually represents a great percentage of the overall legitimate traffic that reaches a web site 1 , it would be of great importance to allow this traffic to reach a web site even when it is under Botnet-based DDoS attack. The work presented in this paper focuses mainly on blocking attack traffic while passing a great percentage of legitimate traffic (represented by search engine referred traffic).
The fact that visiting a web site is usually preceded by submitting a query to Google T M searching for a specific piece of information, then following one of the links provided in the results page leading to that web site, makes Google T M in a strategic position in which it can assist in distinguishing Google's referred traffic from Botnet attack traffic reaching that web site. The proposed scheme takes advantage of Google's position and builds on previously proposed schemes (e.g., Kill-bots [20] ) that adopt the idea of requiring users to solve a reverse Turing test to obtain access to a web server.
The objectives of the proposed mitigation scheme can be summarized as follows:
• Filtering all attack traffic while passing a great percentage of legitimate traffic (represented by search engine referred traffic). It is important to emphasize that the collateral damage associated with the proposed scheme depends on the amount of legitimate traffic that falls in categories 2 and 3. • Performing admission control (i.e., blocking/passing decisions) far away from the victim (e.g., at the edge routers of an ISP's (Internet Service Provider) network).
IV. RELATED WORK
There has been significant amount of research in recent years to thwart DDoS attacks. However, most of the previously proposed countermeasures can not handle the emerging botnet-based DDoS attacks because: (i) Botnetbased DDoS attacks do not necessarily employ source address spoofing. This means that all mechanisms that rely on the assumption that attack packets hold spoofed IP source addresses (e.g., dpf [17] , hop-count filtering [15] , history-based filtering, tracebak-based filtering, D-ward [30] ) will fail to mitigate/prevent these attacks. (ii) Botnetbased DDoS attacks are usually highly distributed (especially in the case of a multimillion-node botnet, where bots are found in almost every corner of the Internet). This means that rate-limiting based countermeasures (e.g., [29] and [31] ) would fail to contain a botnet without requiring a support for installing and managing filters at routers throughout the public Internet [32] .
One of the earliest solutions that addresses the problem of botnet-based DDoS attacks is Kill-bots [20] , a kernel extension to protect Web servers against DDoS attacks that masquerade as flash crowds. Kill-bots distinguishes human users from zombie machines by presenting a puzzle to the client. It provides authentication using graphical tests. These tests are used to quickly identify the IP addresses of the attack machines, which allows it to block the malicious requests while allowing access to legitimate users who are unable or unwilling to solve graphical tests. The proposed scheme, JUST-Google provides authentication using graphical tests but is different from Kill-bots (and other systems that use graphical tests). Instead of authenticating clients at the web server itself, the authentication is performed deep in the network. This feature protects the web server from resource exhaustion based attacks.
Another solution that has been proposed to combat botnet-based DDoS attacks is Phalanx [32] . In Phalanx, a client communicating with a destination bounces its packets through a random sequence of end-host mailboxes; because an attacker does not know the sequence, they can disrupt at most only a fraction of the traffic, even for end-hosts with low bandwidth access links. In Phalanx, a per-packet capability is used to identify which specific packets are to be allowed through the filtering ring at the request of a destination. Flows whose packets are not requested, do not have permission to send and are thus dropped.
One of the major drawbacks of phalanx is the increased latency experienced by all packets due to triangular routing of packets through mailboxes. The proposed scheme is similar to phalanx in the sense that it directs legitimate users to specific node(s) where they have to authenticate themselves (we use graphical tests for authentication while phalanx uses authentication tokens). However, after client's authentication, the proposed scheme does not incur any additional latency for legitimate traffic flows, because we do not triangular routing traffic through any node.
Most recently, there have been enormous research efforts to counter DDoS attacks. For example, Xiawei Yang et al. proposed NetFence [5] as a scalable DoSresistant network architecture. It is based on the idea of using secure congestion policing feedback, to enable robust congestion policing inside the network. Bottleneck routers update the feedback in packet headers to signal congestion, and access routers use it to police senders' traffic. The main problem of this approach is that in case there is congestion in the control channel, a sender will not know how to set the priority of his control requests because setting it too low would not ensure that the request is delivered and that he might have to resend it with more priority points. On the other hand, sending it with an extremely large priority in a lightly congested scenario would result in him loosing a large portion of his priority points preventing from using it in the future.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME: JUST-GOOGLE
We address the problem of Botnet-based DDoS attacks by taking advantage of Google's position as the search engine of choice for so many Internet users. First we explain the basic idea, then we provide a detailed description of the proposed scheme.
A. Basic Idea
We envision a DDoS mitigation service to be provided by Google T M as follows: when Google T M receives a request from a web site X, that is subscribed to this service, indicating that the web site, X, is currently under DDoS attack 2 , Google T M is supposed to perform the following procedure: Whenever it receives a search query that eventually leads to web site X (step 1), it should not provide X's URL in the results page. Instead, a different URL will be provided (step 2). This URL takes the user if interested in this result, to a node that is under Google's control where a temporary web page similar to the one shown in Figure 1 is displayed to the user (step 3). The web page presents a graphical test that is to be solved by the user (step 4). This step is very important as it enables the node to distinguish between legitimate users and bot programs.
Once a correct answer is received (step 5), the node informs the victim (i.e., web site X) about the client's IP address (step 6). This IP address is then recorded in the victim's white-list. The node, then, provides the user with the actual URL of web site X (step 7). By doing so, we ensure that the user will be given access to the web site because his/her IP address is already in the Whitelist (step 8). Figure 2 summarizes the main steps of the proposed scheme.
It is important to mention that the white list is built gradually with the aid of the search engine which is able to tell if a query is provided by a human or by a bot through challenging the client with a CAPTCHA like test. This test is necessary in case the botmaster decides to pass his traffic through the search engine in order to overcome the proposed scheme. Here, we emphasize that we do not assume that bot traffic will necessarily go through a search engine. In fact, since bot traffic will not go through a search engine by default, botnet members will not be included in the white list. Hence, their traffic will be blocked. 
B. Detailed Description of the Proposed Scheme
In this subsection, we discuss in detail the main components of the proposed scheme. First we discuss user authentication. Second we discuss where to perform filtering. Finally, we discuss the implementation of the victim's white list.
1) Authentication:
The main purpose of this component is to distinguish between human clients and bot clients, and such distinction is possible through the use of graphical tests which are widely used today by many web sites. However, different than traditional use of these tests and in order to avoid resource exhaustion that may be caused by the large number of requests coming to a web site, we propose to perform these tests deep in the network and at multiple locations. This can be achieved by taking the user to one of the locations (i.e., nodes) specified by Google T M where a web page similar to the one shown in Figure 1 is presented. When the user provides a correct answer (i.e., solves the test), the node (which is under Google's control) concludes that the client's IP address is a good one. The node will then inform the victim about this IP address such that it will be inserted in its white-list.
One might argue that bots typically know the victims IP address and directly send attack traffic towards it. In other words bots' traffic does not have to go through a search engine at all before reaching the victim. We acknowledge the correctness of this argument and we clarify that if the botmaster chooses to flood the victim this way, then all attack packets are supposed to be filtered because they hold IP source addresses that are not included in the victim's white-list. However, if botmasters chooses to send their traffic through the search engine in order to overcome the proposed scheme, then bots will not be able to solve the Turing test. Therefore, their IP addresses will not be included in the victim's white-list.
2) Where to perform filtering : Usually, DoS attack against an end-system has a direct impact not only on that system, but also on the network in which the targeted system is located. This is due to attack traffic aggregation near the victim, which leads to network resource exhaustion. Therefore, it is of a primary importance to filter attack traffic as far from the victim as possible. In this context, ISP's edge routers would be a typical place to perform filtering because: (1) any traffic destined to the victim has to pass through one of the ISP's edge routers, (2) edge routers are usually computationally capable and can perform the task of packet classification and filtering. However, the major problem with this approach is that edge routers cannot perform accurate traffic classification by themselves due to the lack of knowledge about the ongoing attack and about how to make a distinction between attack packets and legitimate packets.
To enables ISP's edge routers to distinguish between Google's referred traffic that is destined to the victim from all other traffic (which includes the attack traffic), we propose the following modifications to the basic version of JUST-Google: instead of informing the victim itself about good IP addresses (to be inserted in the white list), we propose to inform all edge routers of the ISP network about good IP addresses in order to be inserted in their white lists. This can be achieved by circulating a message among all edge routers informing them about a good IP address. Such message is supposed to be sent, for each good IP address, from a Google T M controlled node. Figure 3 illustrates these modifications. 
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3) White-list implementation:
We assume that a whitelist (i.e., a list that contains the IP addresses of good sources) is to be maintained at each of the edge routers of the victim's ISP network, once a Botnet-based DDoS attack is detected. The primary goal of white-listing good IP addresses is to allow traffic originating from these address sources in the future to pass directly towards the victim without requiring it to go through the validation process by Google. In this context, the white list is supposed to be updated whenever an edge router receives a notification (from one of the dedicated nodes which are controlled by Google T M ) about a good IP address. Whenever an edge router receives a notification, it inserts the good IP address in its white-list, then it forwards the notification to the next edge router such that it knows about the good IP address.
Message circulation among all edge routers represents an important step to ensure that all edge routers know about the sources of Google's referred traffic, such that when a packet, that is destined to the victim, reaches any of the edge routers of the victim's ISP network, it can decide weather to allow the packet or to block it.
C. JUST-Google as a Service
It is important to mention that the success of JUSTGoogle depends on adopting this approach by Google
T M itself. In this context, Google
T M can start providing DDoS protection service by using the proposed JUST-Google system. To this end, we assume that such service will be offered to subscribers based on certain payment model. This will be in line with the technology trend these days where computational resources (i.e., infrastructure, platforms, and software products) are being offered to customers as services. In fact, offering JUST-Google as a paid service represents an important step towards providing security as a service in general which is becoming a hot research topic. As a future work, we intend to investigate a suitable payment/pricing model to provide such service. Possible issues to consider here are developing mechanisms to activate the service. Also, providing attack protection metering service.
VI. PRACTICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES
There are several issues that need to be clarified and important problems that need to be addressed regarding the proposed DDoS protection scheme. In the following subsections, we discuss these issues and address them respectively.
A. Adding Web Browser's Plugin
In Subsection II-B, we assumed that web users who fail to access a web server directly are very likely to try accessing it through a search engine (such as Google T M ). While this argument could be valid for some users, it may be not the case for other users. Therefore, we believe that there should be a mechanism to increase the likelihood of queering Google about a website when it is unavailable through direct access. In this regard, we propose to provide a web browser plugin that redirects users automatically to Google once they fail to access a website. This plugin can be programmed such that it submits the domain name that the user is not able to access as a query to Google. For example, if a user is not able to access www.just.edu.jo, then the plugin will automatically submit the domain name just.edu.jo to Google and the result page is displayed in the user's web browser as shown in Figure 4 . This plugin could be provided either by Google or by the website that is seeking DDoS protection through Google. In this case, the plugin will be offered by the website its visitors in the absence of DDoS attack. Accepting to install this plugin would increase the chances that a user who is not able to directly access a website that is under DDoS attack to get access through Google in case that website has DDoS protection agreement with Google. 
B. Puzzle and White-IP Expiration Times
JUST-Google relies mainly on the white list of IP addresses maintained by edge routes of victim's ISP network and updated regularly by Google. Any packet with an IP address found in the white list would not be filtered. One problem associated with this approach is that in case of a big natted network, If only one legitimate user is authenticated, each bot present in the same natted subnetwork could access the targeted website. Another problem is that attackers are able to insert their bot IP Addresses in the white list by solving CAPTCHA tests presented to them by Google. In the following subsections, we address these two problems respectively.
1) Attackers Behind a NAT Box : In order to limit the window of time through which bots behind a NAT box may benefit from the fact that the IP address of that natted subnetwork has been white-listed through legitimate access to the targeted website, we propose to associate an expiration time (ET ) with each IP address inserted in the white list. This represents the time interval during which an IP address is considered legitimate. To study the implications and effects of having such parameter, we consider a natted subnetwork (NAT-NET) that has both legitimate machines and bots. Setting the value of ET introduces an interesting tradeoff. Figure 5 shows that having a small ET could be very inconvenient to legitimate users because it would require them (i.e., legitimate users) to solve the puzzles provided by Google before their IP address got white listed. However, it provides bots that belong to the same natted subnetwork (NAT-NET) a small window of time to bypass filtering. On the other hand, increasing the value of the expiration time (ET ) would allow more legitimate users from the same natted network to get access to the targeted website without requiring them to solve the puzzle. However, it increases the chances for bot requests originating from the same NAT-NET network. It is important to mention that a request represents only the connection establishment request to obtain the base html file of the website. This means that we do not consider other connections associated with the same request (i.e., those that would be established following the first http GET command). In setting the value of ET , we point out the following important considerations:
• Allowing legitimate clients to download the web page with all its components. ET should have a lower bound that is equal to the time (t download ) that is required to download the web page with all its components from the server plus some margin (δt) to account for queueing an propagation delays. This means that ET min = t download + δt. It is important to mention that t download is a website dependent as it relies on the size and number of objects embedded in the base html file of the website. This requirement is very important as it ensures client's ability to download the web page completely without requiring the user to solve new puzzles through Google. Otherwise, it would be very inconvenient for a user to successively solve multiple puzzles (which could happen if the client's IP address expires) in order to download a webpage from that website.
• Allowing legitimate clients who already established a connection with the web server to be able to continue to send http requests via this connection.
In Subsection V-B.2, we proposed that edge routers of the ISP network to which the targeted website belongs will filter packets that are destined to the victim if they hold IP source addresses that are not in the white-list. While this filtering rule ensures that only packets with white-listed IP addresses could reach the victim, it may cause a problem for packets that belong to an already established connection with the victim where data packets of that connection will be filtered after their IP source address got expired.
To address this problem, we propose to modify edge routers filtering rules to become as depicted in Figure  6 . It is to be noted that this filtering algorithm does not pass SYN packets that hold expired IP source addresses. However, it allows data packets to pass even if they hold expired IP source addresses. This rule is important to support data transmission through long lived connections while preventing new connections from being established for clients with expired IP addresses.
JUST-Google-Filter (IP packet P ) 1. x= source address of packet P 2. if (x is in the white list and not expired yet) * Pass P 3. else if (x is expired AND P.SY N = 0) * Pass P 4. else drop P Figure 6 . JUST-Google packet filtering algorithm. P represents a packet destined to the victim. P.SY N stands for the packet's SYN flag
• Dynamically changing the value of ET . It is clear that setting the IP expiration time to a small value would result in some inconvenience to legitimate users because they would be required to solve new puzzles to renew their IP addresses. For this reason, we propose to set the expiration time of IP addresses dynamically and based on the victim's current load. For example, ET should be set to a large value when the victim is under-loaded. However, it should be set to a small value when it becomes overloaded.
2) Attackers ability to white-list bot IP addresses:
In the proposed architecture, if a bot manages to crack the CAPTCHA, then the bot gets hold of the white list and then it has unrestricted access to the target. This can be done by hiring some people to solve puzzles online or by requesting puzzles in bulk, solve them offline, and submit them at once to white-list a huge number of IPs at a time. We address this problem by specifying an expiration time (e puzzle ) for each puzzle. This is the time that Google will allow for a user to solve the puzzle. If the user failed to submit a valid solution to the puzzle within this time, Google will challenge the user with a new puzzle even if a correct solution was submitted after the expiration time. Moreover, we propose to timestamp puzzles in order to prevent attackers form using previously solved puzzles (i.e., within time interval more than epuzzle). To quantify the proposed solution, we define the following parameters:
• R: the rate at which a human being can solve a puzzle.
• H: the number of people an attacker can hire at a time to solve puzzles • ET : the expiration time associated with an IP address. After this time, the white-listed user will be asked to solve a new puzzle (discussed in Subsection VI-B.1) .
• α: the target number of attack requests a website is capable of handling. For this analysis, we assume that the site is restricting access to IPs such that each IP can have one request in service at a time. The rate at which an attacker can solve puzzles (therefore white-list bot IP addresses) can be expressed as R.H puzzles/second. Each one of these puzzles is good to white-list one IP address, and this white-listing will expire after ET . Therefore, the number of IPs that could be white-listed at a time is H.R.ET . The target is to keep this number below α. So, H.R.ET ≤ α. Therefore, by setting the IP whitelisting to ET we ensure that the target website will not see more than α requests at a time from an attacker that is capable of solving H.R puzzles/second. In other words, we prevent the attacker from collecting a number of white-listed IP addresses that is large enough to lunch an effective attack.
A recent study [6] showed that image CAPTCHAs take humans about 9.8 seconds to view and solve, while audio CAPTCHAs take them about 28.4 seconds to hear and solve. Based on the type of CAPTCHA to be used, we can set the rate R at which humans can solve CAPTCHA such that legitimate users would have enough time to solve the puzzle presented to them by Google. The value of ET should be set to a certain value taking into consideration the implications of that value on attackers ability to abuse whitlisted IP addresses as discussed in Subsection VI-B.1. The other two parameters (i.e., α and H) are specific to victim and the attacker, respectively.
It is clear that setting e puzzle and ET to low values will raise the bar for the attacker as he will need to hire larger number of people to lunch an effective attack. On the other hand, these low values will increase the inconvenience to legitimate users as they will need to solve puzzles at a faster rate. Long timeouts on the other hand reduce the inconvenience to the user at the expense of leaving the site more vulnerable since this requires the attacker to hire smaller number of people which makes it more feasible.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the following two subsections we evaluate two aspects of our system. First, we evaluate the probability of a legitimate user accessing a JUST-Google-protected site that is under DDoS attack. The other aspect is the delay patently that a legitimate user have to pay when accessing a website under attack.
A. Access Probability
In this section we quantify the probability that a user would be able to access a web site that is under botnetbased DDoS attack when JUST-Google is in use. This comes in accordance with the concept of eventual communication that was presented in [32] , which emphasizes that it should be possible for a connection to eventually become established regardless of the number of attackers while keeping the current Internet's open user model.
It can be argued that the collateral damage associated with JUST-Google will be relatively high, because edge routers are supposed to filter any packet that does not hold an IP source address that is already in their white-lists (which includes direct access traffic plus referral traffic from other websites). While this argument is generally true, we believe that user's reaction to connection problems should be taken into consideration. The fact that human users are persistent by nature suggests that a user would attempt connecting to a web server several times before he/she gives up.
In most cases, when a user fails to access a certain website, say www.iastate.edu, directly by typing its URL, he/she would check the spelling to make sure that the URL is valid. Other users would hit the "refresh" button. Other users may use a search engine to locate the information he wants from that website. If JUST-Google is being used to mitigate a botnet-based DDoS attack against website X, then a user will fail to access that web site unless he/she quires Google T M , solves the Turing test, and follows the link provided by Google T M . We model the user's behavior in accessing a web site in terms of the number of access attempts, N , before he/she succeeds or else gives up. We define p i to be the probability that a user will use Google to access the victim website in the i th attempt (i.e., the probability of success on the i th attempt). On the other hand, we define 1−p i to be the probability that a user will not use Google to access the victim website on the i th attempt (i.e., the probability of failure on the i th attempt). This means that N has the following probability mass function (PMF):
If we assume that in each attempt, the user would use Google T M to access the website with the same probability p, or else tries to access the website by other means (e.g., hitting the refresh button), then it can be seen that N represents a geometric random variable with success probability p. Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution function of N for p = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 respectively. It is obvious that as p increases, the user would have better chances of accessing the website in fewer attempts. In practice, we expect that p i ≥ p j for i > j because a user who fails to access a website from the first attempt by typing the URL directly, or by using a bookmark, would try other means to access the website in subsequent attempts. Therefore, there is a better chance that Google T M would be used as the number of attempts increases. For example, if we assume that p 1 = 0.5, p 2 = 0.6, and p 3 = 0.7, then according to equation 1: P (N = 1) = 0.5, P (N = 2) = 0.3, P (N = 3) = 0.14. Hence, P (N ≤ 3) = 0.94. This means that the user would be able to access the website within the first three attempts with probability 0.94 according to the specified success probability in each attempt. Our system involves an overhead of two additional HTTP interactions with Google T M (steps 3-5 and 7 in Figure 2 ). In the first additional interaction, the user obtains the graphical test while in the second interaction the user obtains the actual URL for the site protected by our system. In this section, we evaluate the latency overhead of these interactions. For this purpose, we use 500 PlanetLab [1] nodes distributed around the world to download a page that involves a CAPTCHA test from Google 3 . This page download mimics the first additional HTTP interaction. We then search Google for a random web site address to mimic the second interaction which involves Google presenting search results to the user. We use Wget tool [4] with the "-p" option to download the page with all its components (i.e., embedded images, etc). Figure 8 plots the CDF of the download latency from these 500 nodes for the two consecutive HTTP interactions. The figure shows that over 97.6% of nodes were able to download the page within less than one second. We understand that PlanetLab nodes are well-connected nodes and therefore regular home users may experience longer delays. Furthermore, this latency evaluation excludes the human puzzle solving time which has been found to be in the range of 10-30 seconds [6] . We however argue that these delays are justifiable. In particular, these additional delays are only experienced when the target site is under attack in which case the delays would have been much longer should the site be left unprotected.
B. Latency Overhead

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Botnet-based DDoS attacks represent an emerging and imminent threat for today's Internet. Using Botnets of thousands or even millions of machines, attackers are now able to mimic the behavior of legitimate users without necessarily employ source address spoofing. This paper proposed "JUST-Google" an effective solution to the problem of botnet-based DDoS attacks utilizing the novel idea of identifying legitimate search engine referred traffic with the help of Google T M . JUST-Google is transparent to users and does not require major modification to end systems (except for installing a web browser's plugin as explained in Subsection4). It requires ISP level deployment rather than Internet scale deployment. Meaning that ISPs interested in such scheme can deploy it right away in cooperation with Google and enjoy its benefits regardless its adoption by other ISPs or not. Moreover, it does not incur any additional latency for legitimate traffic flows, because we do not triangular routing traffic through any node. JUST-Google have been evaluated through a combination of theoretical and experimental studies. Our studies show that:
• When applying JUST-Google to protect a certain website, a legitimate user would be able to successfully access that website with a probability of more than 90%.
• The amount of delay imposed by JUST-Google as the result of the overhead o two additional HTTP interactions with Google T M is less than one second. • Attacker's ability to white list botnet IP addresses can be greatly reduced by adjusting the IP whitelist expiration time.
Future work will focus mainly on extending this idea to be offered through other search engines and social networking websites (e.g., Facebook [2] and Twitter [3]) especially that these websites are becoming increasingly popular. Also, we plan to explore other efficient and secure techniques to communicate information about legitimate IP addresses with edge routers of an ISP network. In addition, we intend to investigate a suitable payment/pricing model to offer JUST-Google as a service.
